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Abstract – 
In this paper, we discuss the importance that macroeconomic management, policies 
and stability have on promoting the business environment of a country. For this 
purpose, the analysis of the 1991 Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis in India has been 
done to show how poor macroeconomic management of the Indian economy during 
the 1980s precipitated the BoP crisis in 1991 and led to the disruption of business 
environment during the crisis phase. We then look at how the subsequent corrective 
macroeconomic management and policies led to the restoration and improvement of 
the business climate in the economy. 
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Paper prepared for presentation at the session “Promoting Business Environment in South Asia” of the 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper, we will attempt to underline the importance of macroeconomic policies 
and stability on the business environment of a country by analyzing the balance of 
payments crisis which India faced during 1991-92. 
 
The 1991-92 Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis had far reaching implications for the 
business environment in India, both during the crisis and after it. We show how the 
crisis was precipitated by poor macro management of the economy and then analyze 
the repercussions of the crisis on the business climate of the economy. We then show 
how the subsequent macroeconomic stabilization policies led to the rebuilding of the 
business climate which stood temporarily hampered during the crisis years, thereby 
underlining the importance of macroeconomic stability and management for the 
business environment of a country.    
 
The paper has been organized into different sections. In section 2, we introduce what 
is meant by the 1991-92 Indian BoP crisis and analyze the reasons which led to the 
crisis, central among which is poor macro management and policies of the economy. 
In section 3, we show how the 1991-92 crisis caused by poor macro management 
resulted in substantial damage to the country’s business environment. Finally, in 
section 4, we show how subsequent corrective macroeconomic policies improved 
India’s business environment and put it on a high and sustainable growth trajectory, 
thereby showing how good macroeconomic policies and management can have a 
positive influence on the business environment of an economy.  
 
1.1 Business Environment 
 
The term ‘Business Environment’ is used to describe the general conditions for doing 
business that are present in an economy. It is not possible to exhaustively define 
business environment as the factors affecting it are numerous.  
 
In this paper, we will be using the word ‘business environment’ to refer to those  
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factors which influence business decisions such as investment decisions, private 
investment, etc. in an economy. The term ‘business environment’ or ‘business 
climate’ will encapsulate the conditions present in an economy which have a bearing, 
either direct or indirect, on the prospects for profits and returns on investment, and 
output growth.  
 
Keeping in view the limited scope of this paper, certain indicators (macroeconomic or 
otherwise) have been used to understand the business environment that prevails in an 
economy. In the next few paragraph, we briefly talk about these indicators. 
 
An important macroeconomic determinant of business climate is fiscal deficit. Fiscal 
deficit influences the business environment through its direct effects on interest rates 
and inflation. Interest rates and inflation, in turn, influence business environment 
through their influence on savings and investments. Fiscal deficits also influence the 
business environment of an economy through its effects on infrastructure 
development and availability of credit. 
 
The business climate in an economy is also substantially influenced by factors such as 
the prevailing interest rates and inflation. High interest rates makes credit expensive 
and stifles investments, while high inflation rates is looked upon as a sign of 
macroeconomic instability.   
 
The foreign trade, exchange rate and industrial policy also have a direct bearing on the 
domestic business environment. Such policies can either serve to improve or 
deteriorate the business climate in an economy. The foreign trade and exchange rate 
policies show a direct bearing on external debt and the current account deficit of an 
economy which in themselves are important determinant of the macroeconomic 
stability and business environment prevailing in a country. 
 
Another factor that can play an important part in a country’s business environment is 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The inflow of FDI into an economy can serve as an 
important indicator to gauge the business and investment climate prevailing in an 
economy. 
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2. The 1991 Indian Balance of Payments (BoP) Crisis 
 
“By June 1991, the balance of payments crisis had become overwhelmingly a crisis of 
confidence – of confidence in the government’s ability to manage the balance of 
payments…A default on payments, for the first time in our history had become a serious 
possibility in June 1991.” 
- The Economic Survey (1991-92) 
 
The 1991 crisis had manifold roots central among which is the growing recourse to 
various forms of external borrowing to finance a series of large trade and current 
account deficits in the latter half of the eighties. The foreign exchange reserves were 
also run down to finance the unsustainable external deficit and in mid-1991 foreign 
exchange reserves were barely sufficient to meet two weeks import bill. 
 
Although an active policy of real exchange rate depreciation in the second half of the 
1980s induced good export growth in late eighties, it was a case of too little too late. 
The value of imports increased at a faster pace (than what could be financed by the 
exports) because of the gradual easing of import and industrial licensing requirements 
after the 1980s. 
 
The growing recourse to external borrowing in the second half of the 1980s had led to 
a substantial deterioration in India’s external debt indicators. As a ratio to foreign 
currency reserves, short-term debt soared to a dangerous 382 per cent, signaling the 
heightened fragility of India’s external finances.  
 
The crisis was waiting to happen and the trigger came in the form of the Gulf War of 
1991 and the associated oil price hike tipped India’s fragile external finances into a 
full-blown balance of payments crisis. 
 
2.1 Reasons for the Crisis 
Jalan (2004)1 lays the blame for the crisis squarely on poor macroeconomic 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1Jalan, Bimal (2004): ‘Balance of Payments-1956 to 1991’, in ‘The Indian Economy- Problems and 
Prospects-Edited by Bimal Jalan’, Penguin 
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policies – 
In the eighties, India had imported more than what could be supported by its own 
exports, other receipts and nominal aid flows. The growth in imports was financed by 
commercial borrowings or other borrowings on hard terms. This could be sustained 
only as long as such loans were available. The economy was plunged into a crisis as 
soon as these sources of financing dried up. The roots of the crisis, therefore, do not 
lie in import liberalization per se but in overall framework of macroeconomic 
policies, including fiscal policy, which permitted an expansion of internal demand for 
the home market without generating adequate exports during a period when the 
external environment for aid to India was deteriorating. 
 
Acharya (2002)2 identifies the followings reasons for the 1991 crisis – 
i. A series of high fiscal deficits throughout the 1980s, 
ii. An overvalued exchange rate (aggravated by real appreciation of the 
rupee in the first half of the 1980s) 
iii. Foreign trade and payments policies biased against exports 
iv. Growing recourse to various forms of external borrowing to finance a 
series of large trade and current account deficits in the latter half of the 
eighties. 
 
Below we list the reasons for the crisis- 
 
2.1.1 Worsening External Trade Balance and Large External Borrowings-  
 
In official descriptions, India’s exchange rate crisis has been attributed to continued 
current account deficits leading up to the crisis. For the five-year period 1985-90, the 
trade deficit averaged 3 per cent of GDP, while the current account deficit averaged 
2.2 per cent of GDP. By 1990-91, the trade deficit of 3.0 per cent of GDP was fully 
reflected in a peak current account deficit of 3.1 per cent of GDP (see figure 1), since 
invisibles had turned marginally negative. 
 
These deficits were financed by growing recourse to various sources of external 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
2Acharya, Shankar (2002): ‘Macroeconomic Management in the Nineties’, in Economic and Political 
Weekly, April 20  
 7
borrowing including external assistance, commercial borrowing and increasingly 
expensive NRI deposits. Foreign exchange reserves were also run down. Foreign 
investment was a negligible 0.1 per cent of GDP. The growing recourse to external 
borrowing in the second half of the 1980s had led to a substantial deterioration in 
India’s external debt indicators (see figure 2). The external debt stock to GDP ratio 
peaked at 39 per cent at the end of 1991-92, as did the debt to exports ratio at 563 per 
cent. As a ratio to foreign currency reserves, short-term debt soared to a dangerous 
382 per cent. 
Figure 1 
Current Account Deficit (Four-quarter sum as per cent of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
By September 1990 net inflows of NRI deposits had turned negative and access to 
external commercial borrowings was becoming costly and difficult. By December 
1990 even short-term credit was becoming expensive and elusive. Foreign currency 
reserves fell sharply and dipped below $ 1 billion in January 1991 (see figure 3). 
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Figure 2 
External Debt (Percent of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Figure 3 
Foreign Exchange Reserves (Percent of GDP)  
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
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2.1.2 High Fiscal deficit –  
 
The series of high fiscal deficits in the late 1980s were clearly a major cause of the 
1991 economic crisis in India. The gross fiscal deficit increased significantly from an 
average of 7.2 per cent in the 5 years 1980-85 to 8.9 per cent in the next period, 1985-
90, and even further to 9.4 per cent in 1990-91 (see table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Consolidated Deficits of Central and State Governments 
(As per cent of GDP at current market prices) 
 
 
Note: For 1998/99 onwards the RBI data have been adjusted for revision of GDP estimates published 
by CSO in January 2002. For 2000-01 the central government fiscal accounts have been used. 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Annual Reports. 
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Figure 4 shows us the ballooning of fiscal deficit in the 1980s, reaching a peak of 9.9 
per cent in 1986-87. They inevitably fed into the current account deficits, which kept 
rising steadily until they reached 3.5 per cent of the GDP and 43.8 per cent of exports 
in 1990-91. The eventual outcome of these developments was the June 1991 crisis. 
 
Figure 4 
Government Fiscal Deficit 
(As a percentage of GDP) 
 
        
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
 
Below we try to explain how, in theory, high fiscal deficits can aggravate the external 
deficit. 
 
We know, 
Y = C+I+G+(X-M) --------------------------- (1) 
Also, 
Y-T = C+S ------------------------------------- (2) 
where, 
Y= Income 
C= Consumption Expenditure 
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I = Investments 
G= Government Expenditure 
(X-M) = Net Exports (X=Exports, M=Imports) 
T= Taxes 
S= Savings 
 
Combining and arranging (1) and (2), we get 
 
I + (X-M) = S + (T-G) 
 
i.e. Government deficit (T-G) gives a corresponding deficit in the current account (X-
M), given some S and I. 
 
Mundle and Rao (2004)3 explain how high fiscal deficit aggravated the current 
account deficit in the 1980s in the Indian case – 
 
Growing revenue deficits, combined with losses of public enterprises, have 
constrained the acceleration of public investment. At the same time, the large public 
draft on private savings has tended to push up even administered interest rates and 
crowd out private investments. This has limited the growth of productive capacity on 
the supply side, while the large deficits have continued to drive the high growth of 
aggregate demand. The widening gap between domestic absorption and domestic 
output has led to a growing trade deficit and aggravated the balance of payments 
problem arising from indiscriminate external commercial borrowing. 
 
The view that large fiscal deficits contributed to a widening of the current account 
deficit in India in the 1980s is also reiterated by the IMF (2002)4. 
 
The high fiscal deficits led to a disruption of the business environment by 
precipitating the 1991 crisis of macroeconomic instability, thereby showing how 
_________________________________________________________ 
3
 Mundle, Sudipto and Rao, M. Govinda (2004): ‘Issues in Fiscal policy’, in The Indian Economy- 
Problems and Prospects: Edited by Bimal Jalan, Penguin  
4Cerra Valerie, Saxena Chaman Sweta (2002): ‘IMF Staff papers: What caused the 1991 Currency 
Crisis in India?’, IMF 
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important fiscal discipline (which is one of the most important tools of 
macroeconomic management of an economy) is for an enabling business 
environment. Below we try and explain how high fiscal deficits can directly affect the 
business environment through its interplay in savings/investments, interest rates and 
infrastructure development. 
 
Acharya (2003)5 explains how high fiscal deficits can hurt private investment: 
 
I believe they (high fiscal deficits) constitute the single biggest threat to India’s 
economic prosperity and security. In addition to directly reducing savings, these high 
borrowings eat up resources which could otherwise have been productively invested. 
Such “crowding out” of productive investments occurs in at least two ways. High real 
interest rates and pre-emption of credit are well known processes. In addition, with 
stressed finances and high interest payments burdens, Central and State governments 
cut back on crucial infrastructure spending on power, roads, ports, etc. This, in turn 
discourages private investments further by reducing prospects for profits and returns.  
 
Pre-emption of Domestic Savings - Empirically, we see that from the Eighth Plan 
(1992-93 to 1996-97) to Ninth Plan (1997-98 to 2001-02), while private savings as a 
percentage of GDP (period avg) increased from 23 per cent to 26.2 per cent, private 
investments increased only from 15.3 per cent to 15.9 per cent. The fact that private 
investment grew by much less than private saving during the Ninth Plan relative to the 
Eighth has been used to argue that the rising fiscal deficit absorbed part of the 
increase in private savings and to this extent crowded out private investment, thereby 
helping to keep the current account deficit in check. 
 
Higher Interest Rates – Goyal (2004)6 concludes that rise in fiscal deficit tends to 
put upward pressure on interest rates. This seems reasonable as government 
borrowings are at market-related rates and government competes with other borrowers 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 Acharya, Shankar (2003): ‘India’s Economy: Some Issues and Answers’, Academic Foundation, New 
Delhi 
6
 Goyal, Rajan (2004): ‘Does Higher Fiscal Deficit Lead to Rise in Interest Rates’, in Economic and 
Political Weekly, May 22 
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in the market to finance its resource gap. Similarly, evidence also substantiate the 
general contention that with government borrowing being at market related rates, rise 
in market interest leads to higher interest payments and also higher fiscal deficit.  
 
Effect on Savings and Investments - Fiscal deficit can influence the business 
environment in an economy through its effects on savings and investment. Acharya, 
(2003)7 argues that between 1990-91 and 1995-96 the consolidated fiscal deficit 
declined by 3 per cent of GDP and this fiscal contraction made room for the 
investment boom of 1993-96, which took aggregate domestic investment from 22.5 
per cent of GDP in 1991-92 (to which it had dropped during the crisis) to a peak of 
26.8 per cent of GDP in 1995/96.8 
 
 
2.1.3 Bias against Exports and Overvalued Exchange Rate – 
 
India’s post-Independence development strategy was highly inward-looking. India 
had a heavy anti-export bias and pro import substitution bias. The extent of anti-  
export bias in the trade and payments regime can be gauged by the fact that in 1985- 
86 merchandise exports accounted for only 4.1 per cent of GDP, while imports were 
running more than 80 per cent higher at 7.6 per cent of GDP, entailing a trade deficit 
of 3.5 per cent of GDP. Although an active policy of real exchange rate depreciation 
(see figure 2) in the second half of the eighties induced good export growth in the 
later years of the decade, it was an action too late and did not help much in offsetting 
the high imports. 
 
Even after continuous depreciation of the exchange rate, both in nominal and real 
terms, an IMF (2002) study9 concluded that the Indian rupee was still overvalued at 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7Acharya, Shankar (2003): ‘India’s Economy: Some Issues and Answers’, Academic Foundation, New 
Delhi 
8Note that Acharya, Shankar does not claim that fiscal rectitude was the only (or even the main) cause 
of the investment boom. Other factors, such as the deregulation of industry and foreign trade, strong 
export performance and the overall reform momentum were also at work. 
9Cerra Valerie, Saxena Chaman Sweta (2002): ‘IMF Staff papers: What caused the 1991 Currency 
Crisis in India?’ IMF 
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the time of crisis in 1991. 
 
Figure 5 
Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates (1985=100) 
 
Source: Kohli, Renu (2001): ‘Capital Account Liberalisation: Empirical Evidence and Policy Issues – 
I’, in Economic and Political Weekly, April 14 
 
The overvalued exchange rate seriously damaged the export competitiveness of our 
exports and undermined the potential of our exports to finance our galloping imports. 
This played an important part in worsening our external position. 
 
 
3. How the Crisis disrupted the Business Environment 
 
The crisis severely undermined the business environment of the economy and crippled  
its growth. The Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) estimated the growth during 1991-92  
to be negligible. In 1991-92, the base year of the Eighth Plan, GDP grew by less than 
1 per cent as compared to an annual average growth of about 6 per cent during the 
Seventh Plan period (1985-90). 
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3.1 Poor Industrial Performance 
 
On the industrial front, all the major segments witnessed severe recession during 
1991-92. The index of industrial production grew by less than 1 per cent during 1991-
92. The index of manufacturing production declined by about 1 per cent. GDP from 
industry, which had grown at about 7.5 per cent during the Seventh Plan period 
(1985-90), registered a decline of 1.9 per cent in 1991-92.  
 
Table 2 
Growth of Industry and Manufacturing 
(Per cent per annum) 
 
Note: The sub-sector of Construction is included in ‘Industry’ in the value added data above but 
excluded in the data from the ‘Index of Industrial Production’. 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organisation 
 
The major reason for the poor industrial growth was the severe restrictions on imports 
during the crisis. To quote Acharya (2003)10, “Import compression had reached a 
stage when it threatened widespread loss of production and employment, and verged 
on economic chaos”. 
 
The negative industrial growth severely damaged the perception about the prevailing 
business environment in the economy. Serious doubts were leveled against the 
macroeconomic policies and it seemed India was going through a phase of economic 
chaos. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10Acharya, Shankar (2003): ‘India’s Economy: Some Issues and Answers’, Academic Foundation, New 
Delhi 
 16
Growth in the agricultural sector was also hampered. Agriculture and allied sectors, 
after recording an annual average growth rate of 3.2 per cent during the Seventh Plan 
(1985-1990) declined to 1.3 per cent for the Annual Plan period from 1990 to 1992 
(Agricultural growth fell from 4.4 per cent in 1990-91 to -1.9 percent in 1991-92). 
 
3.2 High Inflation 
 
Inflation (or rather its absence) is the generally preferred indicator of macroeconomic 
stability and thus a good business environment. The first half of the 1990s saw a sharp 
increase in inflation. The decade began with double digit inflation attributable to the 
high fiscal deficit and disruption of industrial production because of the crisis. Four 
out of the first five years of the 1990s registered double digit inflation (WPI), with a 
13.7 per cent peak reached in 1992-93. Inflation moderated in the next two years as 
the stabilisation programme took hold and confidence in macro management was 
restored. 
 
The effect of inflation on business environment is easy to see. High inflation puts 
pressure on interest rates leading to a rise in project costs and investment [Kapila 
2006]11.  
 
Also, most contracts are written in nominal terms. If you’ve agreed to make a set 
rupees payment at some future date and inflation is unexpectedly high, you pay in 
cheaper rupees and come out ahead of the deal. Of course, if inflation is lower than 
expected you take a loss. Either way, someone wins or someone loses. This means 
that the possibility of unanticipated inflation introduces an extra element of risk. Such 
extra risk eliminates some of what would otherwise be attractive exchanges among 
both businesses and consumers [Dornbusch, Fischer, Startz 2004]12. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
11Kapila, Uma (2006): ‘Inflation’, in Indian Economy Since Independence, (18th Edition), Academic 
Foundation, New Delhi 
12Dornbusch Rudiger, Fischer Stanley, Startz Richard (2004): ‘Macroeconomics’, (9th Edition), 
McGraw-Hill / Irwin 
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Table 3 
5 year Avg Annual Inflation Rate (WPI) 
Period 52-week Annual Average 
1981-82 to 1985-86 6.5 
1986-87 to 1990-91 7.8 
1991-92 to 1995-96 10.6 
1996-97 to 2000-01 5.1 
                                                     
Figure 6 
5 year Avg Annual Inflation Rate (WPI) 
                                                
 
Source: Kapila, Uma (2006): ‘Indian Economy Since Independence’ (18th Edition), Academic 
Foundation, New Delhi, p.976 
 
The World Banks’ Investment Climate Survey13 [Batra, Kaufmann and Stone 2003], 
shows that in the Indian sample, more than 60 per cent of the firms interviewed 
emphasize inflation along with three other factors (corruption, infrastructure, policy 
stability) as the most important constraint on their business and investment decisions. 
 
3.3 Interest rates 
 
The 1991 crisis led to a severe disruption and volatility in the money market interest 
rates (see figure 7). The money market interest rates particularly shooted up during 
the crisis period. 
 
Such high real interest rates on medium to long term borrowings for the industrial 
sector work as a constraint in undertaking investment decisions. Persistence of high 
interest costs adversely impacts on the capacity buildup and up gradation. Over a 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
13
 Batra Geeta, Kaufmann Daniel and Stone Andrew H. W. (2003): ‘Investment Climate Around the 
World: Voices of the Firms from the World Business Environment Survey’, The World Bank. 
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medium-term, the high interest rate effect is ultimately reflected in lower output 
growth and deteriorates the business and investment climate of an economy. 
 
Figure 7 
Money Market Rate (Three-month centered average) 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
 
Figure 8 shows some presumption of expected links between real interest rates and 
private investment in India over the period 1985-86 to 1999-2000. In the figure, the 
inverse relationship between real interest rate and gross private investment can clearly 
be seen. 
 
There was also a severe contraction in availability of credit to check inflation (which 
further dampened the business environment) through a restriction on Reserve Bank’s 
(India’s central bank) own credit to the domestic sector, the imposition of a 10 per 
cent incremental cash reserve ratio, a directive to banks not to raise credit limits of 
individual borrowers, a 45 per cent ceiling on the ratio of incremental credit to deposit 
and stricter quantitative controls on bank loans against trader’s stocks. 
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Figure 8 
Real Interest Rate and Gross Private Investment 
(as per cent of GDP), 1985-86 to 1999-2000 
 
 
 
Note: Real Interest Rate refers to the rate prevailing in the beginning of the corresponding fiscal year. It 
is estimated by the State Bank’s prime lending rate minus the WPI inflation over the preceding year. 
 
Source: Acharya, Shankar (2002): ‘Macroeconomic Management in the Nineties’, in Economic and 
Political Weekly, April 20 
 
 
3.4 Hampered Competitiveness to Attract FDI Inflows 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can play an important part in improving the business 
environment of a country. The following are the ways in which FDI can improve the 
business environment prevailing in a country – 
 
i. Technology transfers 
ii. Human capital enhancement 
iii. Competition 
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With regard to the Indian case, Siddharthan and Lal (2004)14, have shown the 
presence of significant spillover effects from FDI. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development15 lists general macroeconomic frameworks as an 
important factor for attracting FDI. The 1991 crisis damaged the attractiveness of 
India for FDI inflow. The increase in doubts about India’s ability to manage the 
current account pressures triggered adverse effects in its capacity to attract FDI. 
 
It was only after the macroeconomic stabilization policies and reforms taken after the 
1991-92 crisis that FDI started pouring into India in a significant way compared to the 
past. FDI averaged only around $200mn annually between 1985 and 1991. However, 
the calendar year 2005 ended with an actual FDI inflows of about $6.5 billion (about 
Rs 29,000 crore). 
 
 
 
4. Corrective Policies after the Crisis 
 
The instability of the 1991 crisis forced the government to undertake major 
macroeconomic reforms to rebuild and restore the investment climate in the economy. 
A conscious policy of industrial de-regulation was followed. The exchange rate was 
devalued and the system transformed in less than two years from a discretionary, 
basket-pegged system, to a market-determined, unified exchange rate, following a 
short intermediate period of dual rates. 
 
The anti-export bias in the trade and payments regime was also reduced substantially 
by a phased reduction in the exceptionally high customs tariffs and a phased 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports. Policies were initiated to encourage 
both direct and portfolio foreign investment. 
 
___________________________________________________________ 
14 Siddharthan, N.S. and Lal, K. (2004): ‘Liberalisation, MNE and Productivity of Indian Enterprises’, 
in Economic and Political Weekly, Jan 31 
15
 Organisation  For Economic Co-Operation And Development (2002): ‘Foreign Direct Investment for 
Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs - Overview’, OECD Publication Service 
 21
Short-term debt was reduced and strict controls put in place to prevent future 
expansion. Medium-term borrowing from private commercial sources was made 
subject to annual caps and minimum maturity requirements. Growth of NRI deposits 
was moderated through reduction of incentives. 
 
Foreign exchange reserves were consciously accumulated to provide greater insurance 
against external sector stresses and uncertainties. 
 
 
4.1 Recovery of the 1990s 
 
Following a crisis in 1991, India has witnessed a turnaround on many indicators of 
macroeconomic performance. It has transited from an onerous trade regime to a 
market-friendly system encompassing both trade and current payments. The 
acceleration of GDP growth to 6.7 per cent in the period 1992-97 was the highest 
India had ever achieved over a five year period. Clearly, macro policy was getting 
some things right. 
 
The sum of external current payments and receipts as a ratio to gross domestic 
product (GDP) has doubled from about 19 percent in 1990–91 to around 40 percent 
currently. GDP growth had collapsed to 1.3 per cent in 1991-92 as the balance of 
payments crisis of 1991 took its toll. The stabilization measures of 1991-93 restored 
macroeconomic stability and fuelled one of the swiftest recoveries of economic 
dynamism and business environment seen anywhere in the world in recent decades.  
 
GDP growth recovered to nearly 6 per cent in 1993-94 and exceeded 7 per cent in 
each of the next three years. Manufacturing recorded average real growth of 11.3 per 
cent in the four years 1993-94 to 1996-97. Export growth in dollar terms averaged 20 
per cent in the three years 1993-94 – 1995-96 and the rates of aggregate savings and 
investment in the economy peaked in 1995-96. Real fixed investment rose by nearly 
40 per cent between 1993-94 and 1995-96, led by a more than 50 per cent increase in 
industrial investment and private investment showed an astounding average growth of 
16.3 per cent per annum during 1992-96. It was, manifestly, boom time for the Indian 
economy. 
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Between 1990-2001, there was a decline in short-term debt as a percentage of foreign 
exchange reserves from an unsustainable 146.5 to a healthy 8.2 per cent and a fall in 
debt service payments as a proportion of current receipts from 35.3 to 17.1 per cent 
(Reserve Bank of India 2002) 
 
Donde and Saggar (1999)16 suggest that macroeconomic policy has had greater 
success in attaining the economy’s output potential in the last decade than in any 
previous period. By the second half of 1993-94 the restoration of confidence and 
liberalisation of foreign investment policies had triggered a temporary surge in foreign 
capital inflow, which added over US$ 12 billion to foreign exchange reserves between 
September 1993 and October 1994 
 
Today, India continues to be one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. 
India’s balance of payments has been strong and inflation has been moderate. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Thus we see how poor macro policies of the government plunged the Indian economy 
into a major crisis and disrupted the business environment, and how subsequent 
corrective macro policies helped in the rebuilding of the business environment and put 
greater resilience in the Indian economy. The growth spurt prior to 1991 was fragile 
and volatile. There was a jump in the growth rate during 1977-79, massive decline in 
1979-80, a jump again in 1980-82, return to the ‘hindu rate’17 during 1982-88 except 
1983-84, climb up again in 1988-91 and crisis in 1991-92. However, after 1991, the 
macroeconomic stabilization policies helped the Indian economy to deliver sustained  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
16
 Donde, K and Saggar, M (1999): ‘Potential Output and Output Gap: A Review’, in Reserve Bank of 
India Occasional Papers 
17
 In the immortal phrase of the late Professor Raj Krishna (‘hindu rate of growth’ refers to the dismal 
growth performance of the Indian economy from 1950-1970s). 
 
 23
growth and show less susceptibility to factors that might contribute to disruption of 
the business and investment climate in the economy. 
 
Thus, for a conducive business environment it is imperative that the right 
macroeconomic policy-mix be chosen. Good macroeconomic policies can reinforce 
strong economic fundamentals of an economy which can act as a buffer to the 
disruption of business environment, either due to an external or internal shock. 
 
The most important and most encouraging lesson is that when we pursue good 
macroeconomic policies we quickly get good rewards in the form of a stable business 
climate and strong economic performance. 
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